MCP server · trust report

io.github.SepineTam/stata-mcp

1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.SepineTam
Repository
github.com/SepineTam/stata-mcp
Install
pypi:stata-mcp
Versions
26
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-21 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean2 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. source/agent_examples/langchain/main.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/stata_mcp/core/stata/stata_do/do.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); src/stata_mcp/core/data_info/base.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). discloses shell/exec capability: src/stata_mcp/core/stata/stata_do/do.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: src/stata_mcp/utils/usable.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: pyproject declares an exec-oriented dependency (pexpect/fabric/invoke) discloses dynamic code execution: src/stata_mcp/core/stata/builtin_tools/ado_install/base.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/stata_mcp/core/stata/stata_finder/macos.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.SepineTam/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.21.1 · current2026-07-16 B804/6 · 65%