io.github.Skyrxin/sast-mcp-server

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_auth.py: assigns a literal to secret (my_j…et (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. sast_mcp_server/config.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (tests/test_e2e.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); sast_mcp_server/integrations/_http.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_e2e.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); sast_mcp_server/cache.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_e2e.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_reporting.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_v07_server.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_sarif.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_scanners.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/fixtures/test_target.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/fixtures/vulnerable_app.js: uses eval(…) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/cache.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/server.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/enrichment/ignore_manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/enrichment/patch_apply.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/scanners/codeql.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/scanners/gitleaks.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sast_mcp_server/scanners/zap.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_enrichment.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_server.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.Skyrxin/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure