io.github.SupercmoHQ/supercmo

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. bin/install.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: bin/install.js: references a credential path (/mcp.json) references credential paths: scripts/bump_version.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) references credential paths: scripts/supercmo_skills/client.py: references a credential path (/.ssh/) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (bin/install.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/supercmo_env.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (bin/install.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; bin/install.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: 4 files (bin/install.js, bin/lib/clihosts.js, scripts/listing_gate.py, +1 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 11 files (bin/install.js, bin/lib/components.js, bin/lib/config.js, +8 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.23 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 10.0.0.1, 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, ai.google.dev, aistudio.google.com, api, api.elevenlabs.io, api.firecrawl.dev, api.getsupercmo.ai, api.wavespeed.ai, assets.getsupercmo.ai, cdn, docs.astral.sh, e, elevenlabs.io, example.test, fal.ai, fal.run, firecrawl.dev, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, getsupercmo.ai, github.com, q, queue.fal.run, rest.fal.ai, wavespeed.ai, www.firecrawl.dev, x.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure