io.github.VamsiSudhakaran1/release-gate

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  release_gate/verify.py: assigns a literal to SECRET (REDD…EN (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_agent_analysis.py: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-a…yz (len 24)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_agent_analysis.py: contains a hardcoded Slack token (xoxb…EN (len 19)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_agent_analysis.py: assigns a literal to SECRET (REDD…EN (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_agent_analysis.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (hand…en (len 31)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_agent_analysis.py: assigns a literal to api_key (a0f8…0c (len 36)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_agent_analysis.py: assigns a literal to secret (envi…56 (len 48)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. examples/llm_agent.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (release_gate/agent/client.py: subprocess.* call; release_gate/agent/client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (release_gate/agent/client.py: subprocess.* call; release_gate/audit.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 5 files (release_gate/agent/client.py, release_gate/agent_analysis.py, release_gate/audit.py, +2 more) discloses dynamic code execution: release_gate/agent_analysis.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses dynamic code execution: release_gate/loop_verifier.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses dynamic code execution: release_gate_api/_frontend.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 5 files (release_gate/audit.py, release_gate/cli.py, release_gate/crypto/governance_signer.py, +2 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.VamsiSudhakaran1/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (Datadog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure