io.github.YawLabs/caddy-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "caddy_reverse_proxy" description: off-vendor URL in a description (`); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "prepare" present and not a recognized benign build command; no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 2.3.2 (minor bump): new tool "caddy_config_get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_config_set" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_config_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_load" appeared; new tool "caddy_revert" appeared; new tool "caddy_config_by_id" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_reverse_proxy" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "caddy_add_route" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_list_routes" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_remove_route" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_adapt" appeared; new tool "caddy_tls" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_status" appeared; new tool "caddy_list_servers" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_upstreams" appeared; new tool "caddy_pki" appeared; new tool "caddy_metrics" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "caddy_stop" appeared.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.