io.github.YawLabs/ssh-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 256 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "ssh_exec" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_exec" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_read_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_read_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_write_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_write_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_upload" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_upload" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_download" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_download" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_ls" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_ls" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_stat" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_stat" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_mkdir" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_mkdir" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_delete" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_delete" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_multi_exec" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_multi_exec" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_find" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_find" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_tail" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_tail" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_service_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "privateKeyPath" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ssh_service_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.14.1 (minor bump): new tool "ssh_exec" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_read_file" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_write_file" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_upload" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_download" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_ls" appeared; new tool "ssh_stat" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_mkdir" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_diagnose" appeared; new tool "ssh_agent_ensure" appeared; new tool "ssh_key_list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_key_load" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_config_lookup" appeared; new tool "ssh_known_hosts_fix" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_test" appeared; new tool "ssh_git_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_multi_exec" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_find" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_tail" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssh_service_status" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.