io.github.addychang/miniurl

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 171 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "shorten_url" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "start_pro_upgrade" has a secret-shaped input parameter "approval_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "add_domain" has a secret-shaped input parameter "approval_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_domain" has a secret-shaped input parameter "approval_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "verify_domain" has a secret-shaped input parameter "approval_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_link" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_link" has a secret-shaped input parameter "approval_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_tag" has a secret-shaped input parameter "approval_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  pass10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.1.0 (minor bump): tool "create_guest_token" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "clear_authentication" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "shorten_url" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "verify_registration_code" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "delete_link" gained input property(ies): dry_run. Low-severity drift (informational; consistent with the version bump).

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://workers.miniurl.com/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)