io.github.adewale/agentic-mermaid

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "elkjs" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ejs" (typosquat candidate); dependency "yaml" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yarn" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/cli/index.ts) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (examples/agent-improve-auth-flow.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/mcp/dynamic-harness.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (examples/agent-improve-auth-flow.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; examples/agent-improve-auth-flow.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: examples/agent-improve-auth-flow.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/cli/index.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: examples/mcp-vs-cli-complex-diagrams.ts: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses dynamic code execution: src/mcp/facade.ts: uses new Function(…) discloses dynamic code execution: src/agent/mutation-ops.ts: uses eval(…) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: examples/agent-improve-auth-flow.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/core.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/facade.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/families-builtin.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/gantt-body.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/ascii/gantt.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/hosted-server.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/ascii/index.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli/index.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/layout/passes/index.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli/init-agent.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/scene/ir.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/ascii/journey.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/xychart/layout.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/scene/marks.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/op-schema.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/quadrant/parser.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/sequence/parser.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/quality.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/architecture/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/class/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/er/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/journey/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pie/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/quadrant/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/sequence/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/timeline/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/xychart/renderer.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/ascii/sequence.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/server.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/state-body.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/scene/style-registry.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/ascii/timeline.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/tool-surface.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/class/types.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/sequence/types.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.adewale/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure