io.github.amitsingh-24/pixlint

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "pixlint" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "pylint" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/pixlint/export/huggingface.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  discloses dynamic code execution: src/pixlint/analysis/autolabel.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/pixlint/analysis/captioning.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/pixlint/analysis/duplicates.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/pixlint/analysis/embeddings.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/core/cache.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/core/cache.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/core/cloud.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/core/loader.py: recursive glob ('**') from a broad root discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/core/pipeline.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/export/extra_formats.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/export/ultralytics.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/transformation/format_converter.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/pixlint/utils/security.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.amitsingh-24/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.