io.github.arcadia-finance/mcp-server

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "write_account_close" param "assets" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn).

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "viem" is edit-distance 2 from top-20 package "vue" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "read_wallet_balances" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_addresses" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "read_wallet_allowances" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_addresses" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_wallet_approve" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_address" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_account_automations" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token0" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_account_automations" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token1" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_account_automations" has a secret-shaped input parameter "reward_tokens" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_account_automations_delta" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token0" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_account_automations_delta" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token1" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "write_account_automations_delta" has a secret-shaped input parameter "reward_tokens" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.4.6 (minor bump): new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): arcadia.finance, github.com.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)