1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.
- Publisher
- io.github.ariffazil
- Repository
- github.com/ariffazil/arifOS
- Install
- pypi:arifos, oci:docker.io/ariffazil/arifos:60.0.0
- Versions
- 1
- Inspected
- 4 of 6 checks · 65%
- Scored
- 2026-07-21 · rubric 1.0.0
What we checked
Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.
Injection surface
unscannable25% of gradeTool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).
No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.
Supply chain
pass25% of gradePackage provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.
repository linkage verified
Credential hygiene
warn15% of gradeHow the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.
scripts/test_api_key.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (Pmsx…Lh (len 64)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. scripts/test_api_key_debug.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (Pmsx…Lh (len 64)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. aaa_mcp/__main__.py) — the recommended intake shape.
Permission scope
fail15% of gradeDeclared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.
HIGH: codebase/apex/governance/fag.py: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (codebase/entropy_dump.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call; aaa_mcp/external_gateways/brave_client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (codebase/entropy_dump.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call; codebase/apex/kernel.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: codebase/entropy_dump.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/deploy_mcp.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/deploy_production.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/kimi_terminal_bridge.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/manage_branches.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/railway_migration.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/railway_verify.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/setup/bootstrap/bootstrap.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/setup/on_workspace_open.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/setup/verification/verify_setup.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/test_import.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_skill_capture_terminal_output.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_skill_route_tasks.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: codebase/integrations/agent-zero/bridge.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: scripts/setup/verification/verify_setup.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/apex/kernel.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/crypto/rootkey.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/crypto/rootkey.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/enforcement/refusal/appeal.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/entropy_dump.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/guards/session_dependency.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/micro_loop/micro_loop_core.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: codebase/system/immutable_ledger.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/consolidate_vaults.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/create_genesis_block.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/create_genesis_block.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/deploy_production.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/entropy_audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/generate_constitutional_vault.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/generate_rootkey.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/generate_rootkey.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/housekeeping.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/init_cooling_ledger.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/kimi_terminal_bridge.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/manage_branches.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/manual_hash_chain_build.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/railway_migration.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/railway_verify.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/setup/bootstrap/bootstrap.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/setup/bootstrap/bootstrap.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/trinity.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_refusal_system.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.
Version behavior
unscannable10% of gradeDiff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).
no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.ariffazil/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.
Transport config
warn10% of gradeRemote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.
manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure
Version history
Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.
| Version | Published | Grade | Score | Inspected | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v60.0.0 · current | 2026-02-10 | C | 72.5 | 4/6 · 65% | — |