io.github.astrogilda/waitbus

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_broadcast.py: assigns a literal to token (expe…89 (len 25)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_broadcast.py: assigns a literal to token (wron…10 (len 22)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_broadcast.py: assigns a literal to token (expe…en (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_broadcast_sub.py: assigns a literal to token (expe…89 (len 25)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_broadcast_sub.py: assigns a literal to token (wron…10 (len 22)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. tests/test_broadcast_robustness.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: waitbus/cli/allowlist.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: waitbus/sources/_config.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (tests/test_cli_completion.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_cli_serve.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_cli_completion.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_broadcast.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_cli_completion.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_cli_on.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_complexity_table.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_daemon_spawner_watch.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_emitter_examples.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_emitter_recipes.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_emitter_snippet.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_install.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_mcp_e2e.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_metrics_endpoint.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_multilingual_snippets.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_sdist_manifest.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_serve_e2e.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_sources.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_subscribe_envelope_hygiene.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_subscriber_snippet.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_waitbus_wait_compose.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/_secrets.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/etag_poll.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/on.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/pr_monitor.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/read_events.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/watchdog_check.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/cli/_shared.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/cli/status.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/cli/install/credentials.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: waitbus/cli/install/systemd.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_broadcast_sub.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_secrets.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_sourcespec_validation_property.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_broadcast.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_broadcast_robustness.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_broadcast_sub.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_cli.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_cli_on.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_emit_batch_property.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_multilingual_snippets.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_pr_monitor.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_serve_e2e.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: waitbus/_broadcast_sub.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: waitbus/broadcast.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: waitbus/on.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: waitbus/cli/_shared.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.astrogilda/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references heartbeat behavior — disclosure