io.github.atomadictech/atomadic-forge

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_forge_auth_a1.py: assigns a literal to api_key (fk_l…23 (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/custom_provider_client.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/import_smoke.py: subprocess.* call; src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/custom_provider_client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/import_smoke.py: subprocess.* call; src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/forge_feedback.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/import_smoke.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/synergy_render.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/test_runner.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/worktree_status.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/commandsmith_feature.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/commit_compose.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/demo_runner.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/commands/commandsmith.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/commands/emergent_then_synergy.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/commands/evolve_then_iterate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/commands/feature_then_emergent.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/atomadic_forge/commands/synergy_then_emergent.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_cli_swarm_aliases.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_sbom_cmd_text_summary.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/import_smoke.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/demo_runner.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/atomadic_forge/a4_sy_orchestration/cli.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/forge_feedback.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/atomadic_forge/a1_at_functions/wire_check.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/demo_runner.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/forge_enforce.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/atomadic_forge/a3_og_features/guard_install.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/atomadic_forge/a4_sy_orchestration/login_cmd.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_js_parser.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_js_wire.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_polyglot_hardening.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.atomadictech/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure