io.github.beepboop2025/pdf-toolkit-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 412 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "pdf_info" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pdf_form_read" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pdf_form_fill" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pdf_decrypt" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 2.1.1 (patch bump): new tool "pdf_read_text" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_info" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_create" appeared; new tool "pdf_images_to_pdf" appeared; new tool "pdf_merge" appeared; new tool "pdf_split" appeared; new tool "pdf_rotate" appeared; new tool "pdf_delete_pages" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_extract_pages" appeared; new tool "pdf_reorder" appeared; new tool "pdf_insert_pages" appeared; new tool "pdf_reverse" appeared; new tool "pdf_blank_pages" appeared; new tool "pdf_crop" appeared; new tool "pdf_overlay_pdf" appeared; new tool "pdf_page_layout" appeared; new tool "pdf_watermark" appeared; new tool "pdf_page_numbers" appeared; new tool "pdf_add_text" appeared; new tool "pdf_add_image" appeared; new tool "pdf_header_footer" appeared; new tool "pdf_stamp" appeared; new tool "pdf_sign" appeared; new tool "pdf_redact" appeared; new tool "pdf_highlight" appeared; new tool "pdf_draw" appeared; new tool "pdf_form_read" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_form_fill" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_set_metadata" appeared; new tool "pdf_decrypt" appeared; new tool "pdf_search" appeared; new tool "pdf_compare" appeared; new tool "pdf_flatten" appeared; new tool "pdf_compress" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_validate" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pdf_repair" appeared; new tool "pdf_attach" appeared.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.