io.github.bowenerchen/cipherhub

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 394 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "key_derivation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "generate_rsa" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "rsa_decryption" has a secret-shaped input parameter "rsa_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "rsa_decryption" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "rsa_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "rsa_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "rsa_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "generate_ecc" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ecc_key_exchange" has a secret-shaped input parameter "alice_ecc_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ecc_key_exchange" has a secret-shaped input parameter "alice_ecc_private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ecc_key_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "ecc_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ecc_key_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "ecc_private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "generate_sm2" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm2_decryption" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sm2_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm2_decryption" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sm2_private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm2_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sm2_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm2_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sm2_private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm2_private_key_structure_parse" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "generate_sm9" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm9_extract_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "master_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm9_extract_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm9_decryption" has a secret-shaped input parameter "user_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm9_decryption" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm9_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "user_private_key_in_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sm9_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ml_kem_decap" has a secret-shaped input parameter "secret_key_in_hex" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ml_dsa_sign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key_in_hex" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "hybrid_kex" has a secret-shaped input parameter "alice_x25519_private_key_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "hybrid_kex" has a secret-shaped input parameter "alice_ml_kem_secret_key_base64" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "hybrid_kex" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bob_x25519_private_key_pem" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "hybrid_kex" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bob_ml_kem_secret_key_base64" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.bowenerchen/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)