io.github.cdnsteve/sugar

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. sugar/billing/api_keys.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (sugar/discovery/github_watcher.py: subprocess.* call; sugar/quality_gates/preflight_checks.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (sugar/discovery/github_watcher.py: subprocess.* call; sugar/billing/api_keys.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: sugar/discovery/github_watcher.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: sugar/executor/hooks.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: sugar/integrations/github.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: sugar/main.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: sugar/mcp/server.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_goose_integration.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/billing/api_keys.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/billing/usage.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/executor/claude_wrapper.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/executor/thinking_display.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/learning/learnings_writer.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/main.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/quality_gates/evidence.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/quality_gates/failure_handler.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: sugar/quality_gates/test_validator.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_core_loop.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_issue_response_integration.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_mcp_integration.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_task_hooks.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_task_types.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.cdnsteve/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure