io.github.creator35lwb-web/verifimind-genesis

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 159 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "consult_agent_x" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "consult_agent_z" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "consult_agent_cs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "run_full_trinity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "run_full_trinity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "x_api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "run_full_trinity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "z_api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "run_full_trinity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "cs_api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 3.26.0 (minor bump): new tool "consult_agent_x" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "consult_agent_z" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "consult_agent_cs" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "run_full_trinity" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_prompt_templates" appeared; new tool "get_prompt_template" appeared; new tool "export_prompt_template" appeared; new tool "register_custom_template" appeared; new tool "import_template_from_url" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_template_statistics" appeared; new tool "coordination_handoff_create" appeared; new tool "coordination_handoff_read" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "coordination_team_status" appeared.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); manifest/source references Tracking behavior — disclosure