io.github.crypto-ninja/github-mcp-server

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_auth.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_individual_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (cust…en (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_utilities.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_write_operations_integration.py: assigns a literal to token (inva…45 (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/github_mcp/auth/github_app.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/github_mcp/deno_runtime.py: subprocess.* call; src/github_mcp/auth/github_app.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/github_mcp/deno_runtime.py: subprocess.* call; src/github_mcp/deno_executor/mod.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/github_mcp/deno_runtime.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/github_mcp/server.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/github_mcp/tools/workspace.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/code-validator.test.ts: uses new Function(…) discloses dynamic code execution: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/code-validator.test.ts: uses eval(…) discloses dynamic code execution: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/code-validator.ts: uses new Function(…) discloses dynamic code execution: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/code-validator.ts: uses eval(…) discloses dynamic code execution: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/mod.ts: uses new Function(…) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/mod.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/deno_executor/test_runtime.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/servers/github/issues/github-list-issues.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/servers/github/issues/github-update-issue.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/servers/github/pulls/github-list-pull-requests.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/servers/test-tool-call.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/github_mcp/tools/actions.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_auth.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.crypto-ninja/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure