io.github.cyyprezz/codex-serverops-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  scripts/manual_auth_window.py: assigns a literal to PASSWORD (oper…id (len 23)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_auth_launcher.py: assigns a literal to token (one-…ue (len 30)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_config_model.py: assigns a literal to password (must…ed (len 18)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_product_probe_askpass.py: assigns a literal to secret (fixt…nt (len 43)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_redaction.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_worker_session_auth.py: assigns a literal to token (expe…en (len 24)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/manage_test_ssh_alias.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: scripts/cleanup_external_test_access.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: spike/askpass/probe.py: references a sensitive credential path (\.ssh\) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: spike/docker/entrypoint.sh: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/codex_serverops_mcp/setup/public_key_transition.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_profile_audit.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_public_key_transition.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_ssh_auth_policy.py: references a sensitive credential path (\.ssh\) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_worker_askpass.py: references a sensitive credential path (\.ssh\) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_worker_session.py: references a sensitive credential path (\.ssh\) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (scripts/elevation_shell_smoke.py: subprocess.* call; tests/test_application.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (scripts/elevation_shell_smoke.py: subprocess.* call; scripts/product_core_smoke.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/elevation_shell_smoke.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/file_shell_smoke.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/manual_release_check.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/product_core_smoke.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/verify_release.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: spike/askpass/probe.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/auth/launcher.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/broker/manager.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/broker/supervisor.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/installer/codex_config.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/setup/launcher.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/setup/ssh_alias.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/spike/auth_ui.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/spike/broker_process.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/spike/cli.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/codex_serverops_mcp/ssh/target.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_broker_reconnect.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_worker_askpass.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/product_core_smoke.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/setup_keygen_smoke.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: spike/askpass/probe.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/codex_serverops_mcp/installer/codex_config.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/codex_serverops_mcp/installer/setup.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/codex_serverops_mcp/setup/ssh_alias.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/codex_serverops_mcp/spike/cli.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_config_model.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_runtime_security.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.cyyprezz/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.