io.github.dalisecurity/fray

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_doctor_webhook.py: contains a hardcoded Slack incoming webhook (http…xx (len 42)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. fray/submit.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (fray/learn.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); tests/test_end_to_end.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (fray/learn.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); fray/detector.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: fray/learn.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: fray/learn.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: fray/recon.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_package.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: fray/csp.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: fray/evolve.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_bypass.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_evolve.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_package.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: fray/detector.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: fray/doctor.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: fray/evolve.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: fray/payload_creator.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: fray/update.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_ci_learn.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_diff.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_hardening.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_hardening.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_scope.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_submit.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_validate_bounty.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.dalisecurity/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (googletagmanager) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references Check for updates behavior — disclosure