io.github.dcondrey/misterdev

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_gatekeeper.py: contains a hardcoded Slack token (xoxb…aa (len 23)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_gatekeeper.py: assigns a literal to password (${DB…D} (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_gatekeeper.py: assigns a literal to api_key (os.e…Y] (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_gatekeeper.py: assigns a literal to token (proc…EN (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_gatekeeper.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (sk-d…ef (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_gatekeeper.py: assigns a literal to password (hunt…o1 (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_gatekeeper.py: assigns a literal to SECRET (tops…23 (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. misterdev/core/evolution/adapters.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (misterdev/agent.py: subprocess.* call; misterdev/core/economics/free_models.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (misterdev/agent.py: subprocess.* call; misterdev/core/economics/llm_cache.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/agent.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/context/change_tracker.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/context/lsp_swift.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/evolution/adapters.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/execution/container.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/execution/probe.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/execution/runtime.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/gitcmd.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/planning/sovereign.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/verification/changed_region_mutation.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/verification/mutation_gate.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/verification/validator.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/core/verification/web_verify.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/environments/venv_env.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/task_executors/markdown_plan_executor/edits_mixin.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/tools/command.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: misterdev/tools/dependency.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_audit_gate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_change_tracker.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_executor_git.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_gatekeeper.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_gitcmd.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_governance.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_orchestrator_fixes.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_polyglot_harness.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_swebench_harness.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_tool_runner.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses dynamic code execution: misterdev/core/context/topography/parsers.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: misterdev/core/execution/container.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_orchestrator_fixes.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: misterdev/core/economics/llm_cache.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: misterdev/core/planning/sovereign.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: misterdev/llm/client/base.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: misterdev/tools/file_io.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: misterdev/utils/file_utils.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_command_tool.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_executor.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_orchestrator_fixes.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_runtime.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_web_verify.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.dcondrey/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (posthog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure