io.github.dmytrome/groundhog-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/groundhog_mcp/config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (src/groundhog_mcp/http.py: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.11.0 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 10.0.0.5, 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, 172.25.0.2, a.com, a.example, a.unknowntld, b.example, bad.example, blog.example.com, captcha.px-cdn.net, cdp.invalid, challenges.cloudflare.com, chrome, client.px-cdn.net, docs.docker.com, e.co, evil.com, evil.example, ex.com, example.com, fast.com, gate.example, geo.captcha-delivery.com, github.com, hcaptcha.com, host, host.docker.internal, html.duckduckgo.com, ok.com, ok.example, other.com, same.com, slow.com, sub.example.co.uk, sx, user, www.google.com, www.w3.org, x.com.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.