io.github.doc2mcp/tabletopsimulator

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "@codemirror/view" is edit-distance 2 from top-20 package "vue" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@opentelemetry/api" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "pg" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@streamdown/cjk" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ajv" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@streamdown/code" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "@babel/core" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@supabase/ssr" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ws" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@upstash/redis" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "redux" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@vercel/blob" is edit-distance 1 from top-20 package "glob" (typosquat candidate); dependency "ai" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "chai" (typosquat candidate); dependency "bcrypt-ts" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "bcryptjs" (typosquat candidate); dependency "cmdk" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@anthropic-ai/sdk" (typosquat candidate); dependency "geist" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "jest" (typosquat candidate); dependency "katex" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "knex" (typosquat candidate); dependency "swr" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ws" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.doc2mcp/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure