MCP server · trust report

io.github.drzamarian/n8n-mcp-community

1 check that ran failed — credential hygiene — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.drzamarian
Repository
github.com/drzamarian/n8n-mcp-community
Install
npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community, npm:n8n-mcp-community
Versions
8
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 90%
Scored
2026-09-10 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks3 clean2 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    pass25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    Scanned 319 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    fail15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tool "n8n_credentials_delete" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credentialId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "n8n_credentials_schema" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credentialType" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "n8n_credentials_get" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credentialId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "n8n_credentials_update" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credentialId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "n8n_credentials_test" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credentialId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "n8n_credentials_usage" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credentialId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    warn10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 0.2.1 (minor bump): new tool "n8n_workflows_list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_create" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_update" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_update_node" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_activate" appeared; new tool "n8n_workflows_deactivate" appeared; new tool "n8n_workflows_get_version" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_get_tags" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_update_tags" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_archive" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_workflows_unarchive" appeared; new tool "n8n_workflows_diff" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_executions_list" appeared; new tool "n8n_executions_get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_executions_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_executions_retry" appeared; new tool "n8n_executions_stop" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_create" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_schema" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_update" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_test" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_credentials_usage" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_tags_list" appeared; new tool "n8n_tags_get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_tags_create" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_tags_update" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_tags_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_users_list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_users_get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_users_create" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_users_delete" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_health" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_insights_summary" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_audit_generate" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_search_workflows" appeared; new tool "n8n_get_node_docs" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_list_node_types" appeared; new tool "n8n_introspect" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "n8n_community_packages_list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

  • Transport config

    unscannable10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.3.0 · current2026-08-13 B805/6 · 90%±0
v0.2.12026-08-05 B1003/6 · 55%±0
v0.1.42026-08-04 B1004/6 · 65%±0
v0.1.22026-07-24 B1003/6 · 55%±0
v0.1.12026-07-21 B1003/6 · 55%—