io.github.duriantaco/skylos

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  skylos/llm/context.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (sk-l…et (len 20)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. test/test_mcp_rules.py: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-a…no (len 30)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. test/test_mcp_rules.py: contains a hardcoded Stripe live secret key (sk_l…no (len 35)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. test/test_secrets.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) test/test_secrets.py: contains a hardcoded Google API key (AIza…AA (len 39)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. test/test_typescript_expanded.py: assigns a literal to token (aB3d…45 (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. skylos/adapters/litellm_adapter.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: skylos/rules/quality/logic.py: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (skylos/api.py: subprocess.* call; skylos/api.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (skylos/api.py: subprocess.* call; skylos/cli.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/api.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/cicd/review.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/cicd/review.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/cli.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/engines/go_runner.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/gatekeeper.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/llm/executor.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/login.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/rules/danger/calls.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/sync.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: skylos/tui.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_async_blocking.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_async_blocking.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_cmd_injection.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_cmd_injection.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_defend.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_discover.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: test/test_sanitizers.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses dynamic code execution: skylos/cicd/review.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: skylos/rules/danger/calls.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: skylos/visitors/languages/typescript/danger.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_dangerous.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_defend.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_discover.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_merger.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_pipeline.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_typescript.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_typescript_expanded.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_validator.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: test/test_visitor.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: skylos/cli.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: skylos/gatekeeper.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: skylos/llm/validator.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: skylos/rules/quality/logic.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: skylos/sync.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: skylos/sync.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_cicd_gate.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_coupling.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_exclusions.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_injection_scanner.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_path_traversal.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_skylos.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_skylos.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_vibe_rules.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: test/test_visitor.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.duriantaco/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure