io.github.eidetic-works/nucleus

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. examples/basic_usage.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (index.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; pyproject declares an HTTP client dependency). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (index.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/mcp_server_nucleus/__init__.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: index.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: .smithery/shttp/module.js: imports child_process discloses shell/exec capability: src/mcp_server_nucleus/hypervisor/locker.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: src/mcp_server_nucleus/cli.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/__init__.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/runtime/common.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/conftest.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/demo_governance.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/runtime/event_ops.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/runtime/memory.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/runtime/memory.py: recursive glob ('**') from a broad root discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/runtime/stdio_server.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server_nucleus/runtime/task_ops.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.15.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): json-schema.org, lodash.com, npms.io, openjsf.org, underscorejs.org.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint present with no declared auth mode (unable to confirm authentication); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure