io.github.elViRafa/memory-fabric

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_security.py: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-A…p6 (len 35)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/memory_fabric/cli.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: tests/test_clients.py: references a sensitive credential path (/mcp.json) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/memory_fabric/installer.py: subprocess.* call; src/memory_fabric/llm.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/memory_fabric/installer.py: subprocess.* call; src/memory_fabric/storage/finalize.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/memory_fabric/installer.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/memory_fabric/storage/finalize.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/memory_fabric/storage/search.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: pyproject declares an exec-oriented dependency (pexpect/fabric/invoke) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/memory_fabric/storage/finalize.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_memory_fabric.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.elViRafa/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.