io.github.epheterson/applemusic-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/conftest.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/conftest.py: contains a hardcoded JWT (eyJh…re (len 154)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_harvest.py: assigns a literal to token ({FAK…N} (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/applemusic_mcp/auth.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/applemusic_mcp/applescript.py: subprocess.* call; src/applemusic_mcp/amp_api.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/applemusic_mcp/applescript.py: subprocess.* call; scripts/integration_test_applescript.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/applemusic_mcp/applescript.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/applemusic_mcp/browser.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 6 files (scripts/integration_test_applescript.py, src/applemusic_mcp/auth.py, src/applemusic_mcp/browser.py, +3 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.20.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): ..., 127.0.0.1, amp-api.music.apple.com, api.music.apple.com, beta.music.apple.com, evil.example, example.com, github.com, itunes.apple.com, js-cdn.music.apple.com, music.apple.com, music.apple.com.evil.tld, spotify.com, url.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure