io.github.flytohub/flyto-indexer

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/index_store.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/cli.py: subprocess.* call; src/analyzer/taint_rules.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/cli.py: subprocess.* call; src/cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/cli.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/diff_impact.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/git_secret_scanner.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/pr_analyzer.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/project_profile.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/quality.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/secret_scanner.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/analyzer/security.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/analyzer/stale_files.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/analyzer/taint_rules.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: src/analyzer/taint_rules.py: os.system/os.popen/os.exec* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/lsp/client.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/tools/coverage_intel.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/tools/git_intel.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/tools/staleness.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/tools/validation.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: src/iac_scanner.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/tool_registry.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/analyzer/security.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/analyzer/taint_rules.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/dependency_scanner.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/engine.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_server.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/safe_io.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/sbom_export.py: recursive glob ('**') from a broad root discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/analyzer/dead_code.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/analyzer/layers.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/analyzer/layers.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/analyzer/rules.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/analyzer/taint_dsl.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/analyzer/taint_rules.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/tools/references.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.flytohub/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (datadog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure