io.github.gateio-dev/gate-dex

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "dex_tx_swap_quote" param "user_wallet" description: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something. tool "dex_tx_x402_fetch" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (pro-api.coingecko.com); capability text should not name where data goes. server instructions: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "dex_agentic_report" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_auth_gate_login_start" has a secret-shaped input parameter "link_mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_auth_logout" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_chain_config" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_market_get_kline" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_address" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_market_get_pair_liquidity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_address" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_market_get_tx_stats" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_address" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_rpc_call" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_approve_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_approve_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_contract" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_approve_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_decimals" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_approve_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_mint" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_detail" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_gas" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_get_sol_unsigned" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_list" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_send_raw_transaction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_send_raw_transaction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_addr" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_send_raw_transaction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_name" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_send_raw_transaction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_short_name" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_checkin_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_detail" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_history_list" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_prepare" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_prepare" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_in" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_prepare" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_out" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_in" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_out" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_sign_approve" has a secret-shaped input parameter "checkin_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_sign_approve" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_sign_swap" has a secret-shaped input parameter "checkin_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_sign_swap" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_swap_submit" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_transfer_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_transfer_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_contract" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_transfer_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_decimals" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_transfer_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_mint" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_x402_checkin_preview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_x402_fetch" has a secret-shaped input parameter "checkin_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_tx_x402_fetch" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_bind_exchange_uid" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_get_addresses" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_get_bindings" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_get_token_list" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_get_total_asset" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_get_wallet_type" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_google_gate_bind_start" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_replace_binding" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_sign_message" has a secret-shaped input parameter "checkin_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_sign_message" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_sign_transaction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "checkin_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_wallet_sign_transaction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_withdraw_deposit_address" has a secret-shaped input parameter "mcp_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "dex_withdraw_deposit_address" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_address" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.gateio-dev/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)