MCP server · trust report

io.github.gzchenhao/openhire

2 checks that ran failed — supply chain and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.gzchenhao
Repository
github.com/gzchenhao/openhire
Install
pypi:openhire, pypi:openhire, pypi:openhire
Versions
3
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-09-04 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean4 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/openhire/config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (scripts/growth_metrics.py: subprocess.* call; design_handoff_openhire_v01/design_refs/support.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/growth_metrics.py: subprocess.* call; src/openhire/pipeline/snapshot.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/growth_metrics.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: design_handoff_openhire_v01/design_refs/support.js: uses new Function(…) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/openhire/pipeline/snapshot.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 0.2.0 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, dynamic-eval, fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.ashbyhq.com, api.deepseek.com, api.lever.co, app.mokahr.com, boards-api.greenhouse.io, boards.greenhouse.io, coreweave.com, databricks.com, e.co, example.com, example.invalid, github.com, job-boards.greenhouse.io, jobs.ashbyhq.com, jobs.lever.co, open.bigmodel.cn, openhire.dev, pypistats.org, unitree.zhiye.com, unpkg.com, unused.invalid, www.brex.com, www.samsara.com, x.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    sends telemetry to third-party SDK (datadog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.3.0 · current2026-09-03 D52.55/6 · 75%B→D in v0.3.0
v0.2.02026-07-27 B754/6 · 65%±0
v0.1.12026-07-15 B753/6 · 55%