io.github.havilandsoftware/mcp-server-innoday

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_board_credential_rotation.py: assigns a literal to token (what…en (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_linear_api.py: assigns a literal to api_key (lin_…23 (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_linear_api.py: assigns a literal to api_key (lin_…23 (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/api/app.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: src/services/container_guardrails.py: references a sensitive credential path (.aws/credentials) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/cli/commands/process.py: subprocess.* call; src/adapters/jira_adapter.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/cli/commands/process.py: subprocess.* call; src/cli/commands/boards.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/cli/commands/process.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/cli/utils/compose.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/utils/process.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/version.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: src/api/app.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/database/backends/local.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/database/backends/supabase.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/middleware/auth.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/middleware/rbac.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/admin.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/ai.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/auth.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/boards.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/integrations.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/organizations.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/platform.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/project_timeline.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/projects.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/releases.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/repositories.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/scopes.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/search.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/tickets.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/routers/users.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/board_credential_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/board_sync_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/container_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/git_sync_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/github_connect_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/github_issue_sync.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/organization_cascade.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/project_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/repository_sync.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/scope_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/services/ticket_generation_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/ticket_manager.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: src/tools/slack_tools.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_admin_delete_organization.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_jira_board.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_license_auto_assignment.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_release_sync.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_releases_router.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_repository_sync.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli/commands/boards.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli/config.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/server.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/routers/boards.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/services/container_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/services/credential_provider.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/services/manager.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/utils/process.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_jira_oauth_service.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  pass10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 0.1.41-beta (minor bump); no rug-pull drift.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references Tracking behavior — disclosure