io.github.hermoso-ai/hermoso

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "draft_brand" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). tool "competitor_teardown" description: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "buy_credits" has a secret-shaped input parameter "quote_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. mcp/client.mjs) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (bin/hermoso.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; mcp/client.mjs: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (bin/hermoso.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; bin/hermoso.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: bin/hermoso.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: bin/hermoso.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp/tools.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.7 (patch bump): tool "buy_credits" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "buy_credits" gained input property(ies): quote_token; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): assets.hermoso.ai.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure