MCP server · trust report

io.github.hypawave/mcp

1 check that ran failed — credential hygiene — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.hypawave
Repository
github.com/hypawave/mcp
Install
npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp, npm:@hypawave/mcp
Versions
9
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 90%
Scored
2026-08-31 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean3 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    pass25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    Scanned 213 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    package name "@hypawave/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate)

  • Credential hygiene

    fail15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tool "confirm_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payer_secret" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "download_files" has a secret-shaped input parameter "claim_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pay_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "access_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_receipt" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payer_secret" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "check_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payer_secret" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    warn10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 0.5.2 (minor bump): new tool "search_offers" appeared; new tool "get_offer" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "buy_offer" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "confirm_payment" appeared; new tool "download_files" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pay_invoice" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_offer" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "attach_file" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "manage_offer" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_invoice" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "my_offers" appeared; new tool "list_sales" appeared; new tool "get_receipt" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "check_payment" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "wallet_status" appeared; new tool "setup_wallet" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_contact_card" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "send_wave" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "read_wave" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "check_inbox" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "send_file" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "receive_file" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_wave_link" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "block_agent" appeared; new tool "enable_wave_notifications" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "save_contact" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_contacts" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

  • Transport config

    unscannable10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.6.0 · current2026-08-27 C67.55/6 · 90%B→C in v0.6.0
v0.5.22026-08-27 B87.54/6 · 65%±0
v0.4.12026-08-13 B87.54/6 · 65%±0
v0.4.02026-08-06 B87.53/6 · 55%±0
v0.3.02026-07-23 B87.54/6 · 65%±0
v0.2.02026-07-06 B87.53/6 · 55%