MCP server · trust report

io.github.imatza-rh/mcp-zuul

1 check that ran failed — supply chain — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.imatza-rh
Repository
github.com/imatza-rh/mcp-zuul
Install
pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul, pypi:mcp-zuul
Versions
19
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean3 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/mcp_zuul/config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp_zuul/tools/_builds.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_hardening.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_helpers.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_tools_console.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.imatza-rh/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.9.0 · current2026-07-12 C62.54/6 · 65%±0
v0.6.02026-04-26 C67.53/6 · 55%