io.github.industrial-aiops/iaiops

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. iaiops/cli/secret.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (tests/test_entrypoints.py: subprocess.* call; iaiops/connectors/fins/client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_entrypoints.py: subprocess.* call; iaiops/core/governance/approvals.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_entrypoints.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_modbus_rtu_live.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_profiles.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: iaiops/core/governance/approvals.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: iaiops/core/governance/audit.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: iaiops/core/governance/evidence.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: iaiops/core/governance/undo.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: iaiops/core/sink/sqlite_local.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.18.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 127.0.0.1, 192.168.0.10, aiops.test, github.com, h, host, siem.example.com, unused.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure