io.github.ivaavimusic/singularity

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 538 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "vault_usage" has a secret-shaped input parameter "computeApiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_list_agents" has a secret-shaped input parameter "computeApiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_list_snapshots" has a secret-shaped input parameter "computeApiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_delete_snapshot" has a secret-shaped input parameter "computeApiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_subscribe_pro" has a secret-shaped input parameter "computeApiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_endpoints" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_endpoints" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_campaigns" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_campaign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_campaign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "tokenTicker" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_campaign" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_endpoint" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_endpoint" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_products" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_products" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_product" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_product" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_endpoint_details" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_endpoint_details" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_endpoint_stats" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_endpoint_stats" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "set_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "set_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_endpoint" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_endpoint" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "request_endpoint_creation_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_endpoint_with_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "request_endpoint_topup_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "request_endpoint_topup_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "topup_endpoint_with_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "accessToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "topup_endpoint_with_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_agent_bindable_endpoints" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sessionToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_my_registered_agents" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sessionToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "prepare_agent_registration" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sessionToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "finalize_agent_registration" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sessionToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "prepare_agent_update" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sessionToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "finalize_agent_update" has a secret-shaped input parameter "sessionToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "submit_agent_feedback" has a secret-shaped input parameter "apiKey" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.7.0 (minor bump): new tool "vault_usage" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "vault_list_agents" appeared; new tool "vault_list_snapshots" appeared; new tool "vault_delete_snapshot" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "vault_subscribe_pro" appeared; new tool "vault_how_to_backup" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)