io.github.jamesdfinance-dev/lazaretto

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "scan_artifact" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "scan_lockfile_deep" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "scan_artifact" description: cross-tool redirection ('instead of call…'). tool "scan_artifact" description: off-vendor URL in a description (lazaretto.dev); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "scan_mcp_server" description: off-vendor URL in a description (lazaretto.dev); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "scan_mcp_server" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "find_attestation" description: off-vendor URL in a description (lazaretto.dev); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. index.mjs) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (index.mjs: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.2.4 (patch bump): tool "find_attestation" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); new tool "scan_mcp_server" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "check_mcp_tools" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): example.com, github.com, lazaretto.dev, lazaretto.dev..

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)