MCP server · trust report

io.github.jee1/memento-mcp-server

Passes 0 checks with a soft flag on supply chain, credential hygiene, permission scope and transport config — worth a look, not a dealbreaker.

Publisher
io.github.jee1
Repository
github.com/jee1/memento
Install
npm:memento-mcp-server
Versions
1
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-09-07 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks0 clean4 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command; dependency "@google/genai" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "openai" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@memento/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate)

  • Credential hygiene

    warn15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    scripts/log-issue-monitor/__tests__/sanitizer.spec.ts: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-p…MA (len 164)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/mcp-http-client.js) — the recommended intake shape.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (scripts/auto-setup.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/mcp-http-client.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/auto-setup.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/auto-setup.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: 13 files (scripts/auto-setup.js, scripts/mcp-http-client.js, scripts/pack-with-restore.js, +10 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/auto-setup.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/backup-embeddings.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/restore-memory-db-from-corrupt.mjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.jee1/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.30.0 · current2026-09-06 C67.54/6 · 65%