io.github.jmcentire/kindex

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_trusted_search.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (stat…en (len 21)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_v8_search_honesty.py: assigns a literal to token (v8pr…en (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_v8_search_honesty.py: assigns a literal to token (v8wi…en (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/kindex/attention.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: src/kindex/cli.py: references a credential path (/.cursor/) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/kindex/actions.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); src/kindex/llm.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/kindex/actions.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); src/kindex/cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: 16 files (src/kindex/actions.py, src/kindex/attention.py, src/kindex/cli.py, +13 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 7 files (src/kindex/cli.py, src/kindex/dream.py, src/kindex/hooks.py, +4 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.34.0 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.example.com, api.linear.app, api.openai.com, api.telegram.org, api.voyageai.com, e.co, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, github.com, hooks.slack.com, kindex.tools, opencode.ai, www.apple.com, x, y.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure