io.github.john-broadway/pacioli

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  pacioli/tests/test_consent.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (s3cr…nd (len 31)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_registry.py: assigns a literal to api_key (env:…EY (len 20)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_registry.py: assigns a literal to api_key (inli…ok (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_registry.py: assigns a literal to secret (file…/x (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_seal_gate.py: assigns a literal to token (raw-…en (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_spine.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (mark…en (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_store.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (out-…en (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (raw-…py (len 22)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (raw-…en (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (pi-r…en (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (pi-c…en (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (pe-r…en (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (pe-c…en (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (je-r…en (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (je-d…en (len 24)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (je-c…en (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. pacioli/tests/test_tools.py: assigns a literal to token (je-c…en (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (pacioli/tests/test_store_torn_write.py: subprocess.* call; pacioli/erpnext.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (pacioli/tests/test_store_torn_write.py: subprocess.* call; pacioli/runtime.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: pacioli/tests/test_store_torn_write.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/runtime.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/_torn_write_crash_worker.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/test_a2a_signing.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/test_doctor.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/test_runtime.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/test_runtime.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/test_store.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pacioli/tests/test_store_seal.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.john-broadway/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references heartbeat behavior — disclosure