io.github.jongko54/web-embedding

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 10 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. bin/web-embedding.mjs) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (bin/web-embedding.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; bundle/source-first-clone/mcp/source_first_clone/capture_bundle.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (bin/web-embedding.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/check_clone_quality_bench.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 7 files (bin/web-embedding.mjs, bundle/source-first-clone/mcp/source_first_clone/acquisition.py, scripts/benchmark_authenticated_corpus.py, +4 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 8 files (scripts/check_clone_quality_bench.py, scripts/check_integration_smoke.py, scripts/check_integration_smoke.py, +5 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.jongko54/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (googletagmanager) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure