MCP server · trust report

io.github.littlebearapps/outlook-assistant

Passes 2 checks with a soft flag on permission scope and transport config — worth a look, not a dealbreaker.

Publisher
io.github.littlebearapps
Repository
github.com/littlebearapps/outlook-assistant
Install
npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant, npm:@littlebearapps/outlook-assistant
Versions
10
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean2 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    install hook "prepare" is a recognized benign build command; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. config.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: calendar/accept.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/attachments.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/attachments.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: calendar/cancel.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/conversations.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/conversations.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: calendar/create.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: folder/create.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: rules/create.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: calendar/decline.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: calendar/delete.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: folder/delete.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/delta.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/export.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/export.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/folder-utils.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: utils/graph-api.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/headers.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: advanced/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: categories/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: contacts/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: rules/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: settings/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: calendar/list.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/list.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: folder/list.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: rules/list.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/mark-as-read.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/mime.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: folder/move.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: outlook-auth-server.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/read.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/search.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: email/send.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: folder/stats.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: auth/token-manager.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: auth/token-manager.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: auth/token-storage.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: auth/tools.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.littlebearapps/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references Tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v3.8.1 · current2026-05-26 B87.54/6 · 65%