io.github.manumarri-sudo/quill

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. examples/multi_agent_demo.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: src/quill/cli.py reads a credential path, executes commands, and makes network calls in the same file — the combination that makes exfiltration possible. HIGH: downloads and pipes straight to a shell (experiments/vibe_coder_harness.py: pipes a download into a shell). references credential paths: src/quill/cli.py: references a credential path (/.cursor/) references credential paths: src/quill/taint.py: references a credential path (id_rsa) has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (experiments/vibe_coder_harness.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); src/quill/cli.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: 4 files (experiments/vibe_coder_harness.py, src/quill/cli.py, src/quill/notify.py, +1 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 5 files (src/quill/cli.py, src/quill/learning.py, src/quill/notify.py, +2 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.manumarri-sudo/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (Datadog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure