io.github.marcoguillermaz/tierward

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/utils/clone-repo.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/context-builder/inference/algo.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/context-builder/inference/llm.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/context-builder/inference/algo.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/commands/add.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/context-builder/inference/algo.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/utils/clone-repo.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/commands/doctor.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/commands/init-in-place.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/utils/print-plan.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/mcp/server.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/add.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/context-builder/inference/algo.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/generators/claude-md.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/generators/claude-md.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/utils/claudemd-update.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/generators/context-import.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/generators/context-import.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/context.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/context.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/context-builder/interview/dev-flow.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/doctor.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/scaffold/index.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/scaffold/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/init-from-context.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/init-greenfield.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/init-in-place.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/init.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/new-skill.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/new-skill.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/context-builder/interview/pm-flow.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/utils/print-plan.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/upgrade.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/commands/upgrade.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/utils/validate-context.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/context-builder/writer.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.marcoguillermaz/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.