MCP server · trust report

io.github.matbanik/pomera

1 check that ran failed — permission scope — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.matbanik
Repository
github.com/matbanik/Pomera-AI-Commander
Install
pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander, pypi:pomera-ai-commander, npm:pomera-ai-commander
Versions
17
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean3 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/postinstall.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: tools/mcp_widget.py: references a sensitive credential path (/mcp.json) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: pomera_mcp_server.py: references a sensitive credential path (/mcp.json) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (bin/pomera-ai-commander.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; tools/ai_tools.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (bin/pomera-ai-commander.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/postinstall.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: bin/pomera-ai-commander.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: bin/pomera-create-shortcut.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: bin/pomera.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/postinstall.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: create_shortcut.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tools/diff_viewer.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: core/load_presets_dialog.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tools/mcp_widget.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: pomera.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tools/validate_version.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/validate-release-workflow.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tools/curl_tool.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/postinstall.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/backup_manager.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/backup_recovery_manager.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/backup_recovery_manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/content_hash_cache.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tools/curl_settings.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tools/curl_tool.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/data_directory.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/database_settings_manager.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tools/folder_file_reporter.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tools/mcp_widget.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tools/mcp_widget.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/migration_test_suite.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/migration_validator.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/performance_monitor.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: core/persistence_manager.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pomera.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/validate-release-workflow.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/validate-release-workflow.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/build.sh: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.matbanik/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.5.1 · current2026-05-31 C67.54/6 · 65%