MCP server · trust report

io.github.mindstone/mcp-server-retell-ai

3 checks that ran failed — injection surface, credential hygiene and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.mindstone
Repository
github.com/mindstone/mcp-servers
Install
npm:@mindstone/mcp-server-retell-ai, npm:@mindstone/mcp-server-retell-ai, npm:@mindstone/mcp-server-retell-ai, npm:@mindstone/mcp-server-retell-ai
Versions
4
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 90%
Scored
2026-09-03 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean4 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    fail25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    tool "update_retell_llm" param "general_tools" description: text addressed to the model rather than describing a capability. tool "create_batch_call" description: 'before using this tool…' preamble (tool-poisoning shape). tool "create_knowledge_base" param "knowledge_base_urls" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "add_knowledge_base_sources" param "knowledge_base_urls" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "configure_retell_api_key" description: off-vendor URL in a description (www.retellai.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    install hook "prepare" present and not a recognized benign build command

  • Credential hygiene

    fail15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tool "configure_retell_api_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 0.2.4 (minor bump): new tool "create_phone_call" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_web_call" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_call" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_calls" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_concurrency" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "stop_call" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_batch_call" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_agent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_agents" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_agent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "update_agent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "publish_agent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "delete_agent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_agent_versions" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "update_retell_llm" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_retell_llm" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_retell_llm" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "delete_retell_llm" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_retell_llms" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_voices" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_phone_numbers" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_phone_number" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "update_phone_number" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "delete_phone_number" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_knowledge_bases" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_knowledge_base" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_knowledge_base" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "add_knowledge_base_sources" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_chat_agents" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_chats" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_chat" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "configure_retell_api_key" whose description contains embedded outbound URL.

  • Transport config

    unscannable10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.3.0 · current2026-08-05 F37.55/6 · 90%B→F in v0.3.0
v0.2.42026-06-11 B87.53/6 · 55%