io.github.musharna/jobd

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/export_project_cwd_corpus.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/job_cli/fleet.py: subprocess.* call; scripts/healthcheck.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/job_cli/fleet.py: subprocess.* call; src/jobd/events.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/job_cli/fleet.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/jobd/gpu_holder_probe.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/jobd/worker/job_worker.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 4 files (src/jobd/events.py, src/jobd/broker/admission.py, src/jobd/broker/routes/jobs.py, +1 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.5.42 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 127.0.0.1, api.github.com, broker, broker.test, github.com, test, test.invalid, x.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references heartbeat behavior — disclosure