io.github.musharna/jobd

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/job_cli/cli.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/jobd/gpu_holder_probe.py: subprocess.* call; src/jobd/client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/jobd/gpu_holder_probe.py: subprocess.* call; src/jobd/app.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/jobd/gpu_holder_probe.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/jobd/worker/job_worker.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_cli_broker_errors.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_preemption_handler.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/integration/test_broker_concurrency_live.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/integration/test_cancel_latency.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/integration/test_hook_forward.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/mcp/test_cli_parity.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/unit/test_main_entry.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/unit/test_subreaper_real_execution.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_cli.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/jobd/app.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/jobd/events.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/jobd/mcp/server.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/jobd/worker/job_worker.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_events.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/unit/test_events_endpoint.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.musharna/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references heartbeat behavior — disclosure