io.github.n24q02m/better-telegram-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/cf-deploy.mjs) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (scripts/cf-deploy.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/cf_full_flow.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/cf-deploy.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/better_telegram_mcp/backends/bot_backend.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: 5 files (scripts/cf-deploy.mjs, scripts/clean-venv.mjs, scripts/deploy_cf.py, +2 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/better_telegram_mcp/backends/bot_backend.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/better_telegram_mcp/backends/user_backend.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/better_telegram_mcp/transports/credential_store.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 4.17.0 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 0.0.0.0, 10.0.0.1, 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, 172.16.0.1, 192.168.1.1, 93.184.216.34, api.telegram.org, core.telegram.org, example.com, gaierror.attacker.com, github, github.com, ipv4mapped-private.attacker.com, ipv4mapped.attacker.com, kv.internal, malicious-domain-resolving-to-local.com, mcp.example.com, mcp.n24q02m.com, metadata.google.internal, mixed-ips.attacker.com, nonexistent.domain.internal, resolves-to-nothing.com, t.me, telegram.n24q02m.com, www.w3.org.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure