io.github.ndesv21/socialclaw

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (getsocialclaw.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "connect_account" has a secret-shaped input parameter "botToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/index.mjs) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/index.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/index.mjs: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/index.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/index.mjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: src/index.mjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/index.mjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.18 (patch bump): new tool "refresh_analytics" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_instagram_media" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_instagram_comments" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "reply_instagram_comment" appeared; new tool "hide_instagram_comment" appeared; new tool "delete_instagram_comment" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_instagram_media_insights" appeared; new tool "get_instagram_profile" appeared; new tool "get_instagram_account_insights" appeared; new tool "react_instagram_message" appeared; new tool "list_instagram_mentions" appeared; new tool "list_instagram_conversations" appeared; new tool "get_instagram_messages" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "send_instagram_message" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): discord.com, getsocialclaw.com, github.com, t.me, www.facebook.com, www.linkedin.com, www.pinterest.com, www.reddit.com, www.tiktok.com, www.youtube.com, x.com.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure